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Abstract
This paper examines how reference, sense, and pragmatic issues are 
taken to be constitutive of meaning, and argues that pragmatics has 
been systematically undervalued in semantical theorizing. Affording 
pragmatics its proper place in semantics is argued to enable a reso-
lution of the problem of vagueness and the sorites paradox.
1.0   Language and meaning
Semantical theories examine the relationship between language and meaning. 
The generally accepted view (following Dummett 1975) is that meaning in-
volves some combination of reference, sense, and pragmatics. For example, 
consider the two sentences below:
(S1) Marilyn Monroe was blonde.
(S2) Norma Jean was blonde.
1.1   Reference
The reference of a word is what that word refers to in the world. An account 
of reference will explain the relationship between the name ‘Marilyn Monroe’ 
and the object named by it, between the adjective ‘blonde’ and the set of ob-
jects which have the property of blondeness, and so on. Such an account 
seeks to answer the question ‘in virtue of what does this name refer to this 
object?’. A treatment might start with a simple context (say, two people 
pointing to a thing they can both see and introducing a name for it) and build 
out towards more complex cases. (Note that since sentences without language 
users are presumably meaningless, semantical theories tend to discuss the 
key relationship as being between mind and object, or as between interpreted 
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sentences and object, rather than simply between word and object.)
1.2   Sense
The sense of a word is what the speaker grasps. For example, (S1) and (S2) 
describe the same object of reference in different ways, such that it is possi-
ble to believe one but not the other. If they, or the sentences ‘Norma Jean is 
Marilyn Monroe’ and ‘Marilyn Monroe is Marilyn Monroe’, mean different 
things, then meaning must include something other than the reference, since 
the reference is the same: that extra component is the sense.
1.3   Pragmatics
Finally, pragmatics looks at how social context can help determine meaning. 
The same sentence (even referring to the same objects and with the same 
sense) can perform different functions depending on a range of contextual fac-
tors. For example, the sentence ‘The candidate shows excellent taste in neck-
ties’, uttered twice by me in reference to the same person, could function as 
high praise in the context of a selection panel for a necktie designer, but as 
damning with faint praise in the context of a selection panel for a surgical po-
sition. If these different functions constitute differences in meaning, then a se-
mantical theory needs to include pragmatics.
1.4    The role of pragmatics in determining reference  
has been undervalued
The tripartite division of meaning above might seem to suggest that prag-
matics is distinct from reference and sense. Indeed, historically, semantical 
theories have been primarily the domain of philosophers who take mathemat-
ics as an ideal, and fall back on logic as an ideal where mathematics is shown 
to be problematic (this was for example for project of Whitehead & Russell 
1910). Their examples of reference therefore tend to stretch from proper 
names (the paradigmatic case of reference), through picking objects from a 
set, to large astronomical objects (the sun, stars) and a few respectable physi-
cal kinds of things such as water and gold. Pragmatics, concerned with a 
more messy and complex social aspect of meaning, is seen as part of a sepa-
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rate and more empirical endeavor, required to explain how language is used 
to perform some social tasks (such as damning with faint praise) distinct from 
the proper logical or set-theoretical goals of language as it ought to be. (It is 
telling that the author studied semantics, logic, and axiomatic mathematics as 
a single strand of courses in a philosophy department and towards a science 
degree, but had to cross to the English literature department to study a sepa-
rate strand that included pragmatics and sociolinguistics – with no classmates 
or teaching staff in common, and towards an arts degree.)
However, this distinction seems entirely artificial. For example, for (S1), 
the relationship between my mind and Monroe, who died years before my 
birth, is a complex one. Making out, for example, a causal link between the 
object of reference and me, by way of explaining how I can refer successfully 
to her (in virtue of what does this name refer to this object?), would bring into 
view a broad community of language users and media, extended in time at 
least from an act of naming in 1926 through to today. The sense of the name 
as I grasp it centers around a 1973 pop song and a 1959 film I watched on an 
airline screen so poor I still have little idea what Monroe looked like – and yet 
I still, presumably, can be made out as referring here to Monroe. Sense and 
reference in the case of this unexceptional proper name seem ineluctably and 
messily social, which is to say, pragmatic.
The meaning of ‘blonde’ (the extension of the predicate ‘is blonde’, pos-
session of the property of blondeness, membership in the set of blonde things), 
likewise, does not seem to me to be something we can divorce from a richly 
pragmatic context. Just as with the proper name ‘Monroe’, what I grasp as 
the sense of the term is a pragmatic issue that brings into view my previous 
encounters with it and related terms, and making out what I refer to (or, as-
suming I refer to some real property or set of blondness, making out in virtue 
of what I manage to so refer), again brings into view a broad community of 
language users, of how they use (apply, deny, avoid, and so on) ‘is blonde’.
This general point about how pragmatic considerations determine sense 
and reference is easily overlooked when dealing with sentences like ‘The 
Morning Star is Venus’ or an imagined utterance of ‘I call this stuff “water”’, 
as the tacit assumption that there are distinct objects (stars, for example) 
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somehow independent of our socially-mediated language or concepts is super-
ficially credible. On this view, a messy and complex social account of how I 
gained the sense I have of ‘star’ or of how I come to refer to Venus in partic-
ular is unnecessary because it seems too obvious: a star is that kind of thing, 
and let’s call that one ‘Venus’.
This view seems unlikely to survive an encounter with a radically differ-
ent human culture – let alone a non-human one – which would I think reveal 
that our shared agreement about the nature of ‘a star’ and of ‘this one’ is a 
contingent one which does depend on socially-mediated language or concepts. 
Imagine for example how incomprehensible ‘This star is Venus’ would be in a 
culture of blind diggers; or of people who view lights in the sky as glimmer-
ings through a cloak of night and not durative objects to be individuated.
In any case, the necessary pragmatic considerations are less easily over-
looked when dealing with Monroe and blondeness, when the latter in particu-
lar has a somewhat arbitrary and socially-constructed flavor. They could pre-
sumably be made more obvious yet by using words so new (and likely 
transitory) that we are actually consciously aware of the social processes that 
introduced them and continue to negotiate their proper applicability: for ex-
ample, evaluating the truth of ‘Taylor Swift’s Girl Squad all Tebowed at the 
awards’ would require a nuanced understanding of who was and wasn’t in 
the ‘squad’ at the time and also what pose constitutes a Tebow, an under-
standing which has altered as the internet meme has developed. I suggest 
that making out the sense or reference of any of these terms – Venus/star, 
water/stuff, Monroe/person, blonde/person’s property, Taylor Swift’s Girl 
Squad/squad, Tebow/person’s action – necessarily involves ineluctably prag-
matic considerations. Astronomical stars and girl squads are different types 
of things, but referring to either involves processes of social negotiation 
whereby we agree that each is a distinct type of thing (or action or property 
etc.), and how we should individuate instances of that thing, and that we shall 
use a particular term to refer to this instance.
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2.0   The sorites paradox and the problem of vagueness
Vague predicates are characterized by being subject to sorites reasoning. To 
give a classic example:
(1) A man with no hairs on his head is bald.
(T)  There is no number, n, such that a man with n hairs on his head 
is bald but a man with n’ (the successor of n, n+1) hairs on his 
head is not bald.
Therefore (2) A man with a million hairs on his head is bald.
(1) is true; to claim otherwise is surely to fail to understand ‘bald’. (T) looks 
plausible, given that the hairs are of similar distribution, color, thickness, and 
so on; it can presumably be made more plausible by reducing the increment 
from one hair to, say, an extra micrometer of hair strand. (2), though clearly 
false, is derived from (1) and (T).
The intuition expressed by (T) can be thought of as vague predicates be-
ing ‘tolerant’ or ‘boundaryless’ – such that tiny changes cannot make the dif-
ference between the predicate applying and not. Vague predicates are there-
fore to be contrasted with precise predicates, for example ‘weighs under 1 
kg’, which have a boundary (1 kg) around which even tiny changes (in 
weight) could make the difference between the predicate applying and not.
Almost every empirical expression in natural language seems to be 
sorites-susceptible. For example, we might rerun the sorites on ‘can constitute 
an everyday macro object’ (with n standing in for number of atoms) and con-
clude that no number of atoms are sufficient. Or we might proceed via the 
contraposition of (T) from the premiss that some large number is sufficient, 
and conclude that even one atom can constitute an everyday macro object. 
Even the example above of a precise predicate – ‘weighs under 1 kg’ – is 
vague if a version of (T) that adds or removes a single atom, or a lone hadron, 
is accepted.
Sorites produce absurd conclusions apparently licensed by accepted stan-
dards of argument, and thus pose a serious challenge to those standards, mak-
ing vagueness a major topic in the philosophy of logic and language and in 
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metaphysics (see for example Williamson 1994, 2007).
2.1    The sorites paradox can be reformulated logically  
in various ways
As an aside for logicians, this version of the sorites reaches the paradoxical 
conclusion through repeated applications of universal generalization, modus 
ponens, cut, and then contraction. It is worth considering a fuller version of 
this proof, since moves so far suppressed may be singled out as being objec-
tionable. I will represent (1) by ‘B0’; and (T) as ∀n(Bn→Bn’) (equivalently 
∀n¬(Bn&¬Bn’), or ¬∃n(Bn&¬Bn’)).
(T) ∴ B0→B1     universal instantiation
B0→B1, B0 ∴ B1    modus ponens
B0, (T) ∴ B1      cut (transitivity)
(T) ∴ B1→B2     universal instantiation
B1→B2, B1 ∴ B2    modus ponens
B1, (T) ∴ B2      cut
B0, (T), (T) ∴ B2    cut
Repeating this entire process 500,000 times will produce:
B0, (T), (T), . . . [a total of 1,000,000 instances], (T) ∴ B1,000,000
Using contraction to dispose of the unwanted repetitions of (T):
B0, (T) ∴ B1,000,000
However, the paradox can be reformulated to avoid each of these logical 
rules, making an easy logical solution to the paradox unavailable. For exam-
ple, taking (T) as ∀n¬(Bn&¬Bn’), modus ponens can be avoided in favor of a re-
ductio ad absurdum. Universal instantiation can be avoided by including as 
premisses instances of (T) for all required values of n; if (T) is convincing as a 
premiss, instances of it are more so. A series of questions (‘Is a man with n 
hairs bald?’) seems to give rise to the same paradoxical results; we must 
change answers at some point in defiance of the intuition expressed in (T). 
Premisses (1) and (T) with the Peano arithmetic induction axiom (B0&∀n(Bn→
Bn’))→∀nBn deliver ∀nBn. Conversely, the denial of this paradoxical conclusion, 
with premiss (1) and the least number principle, deliver ∃n(n≥0&(Bn&¬Bn’)), 
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again in conflict with the intuition expressed in (T). And again, contraposition 
of (T) and the premiss that a man with million hairs on his head is not bald 
will yield through the same steps that a man with no hair is not bald.
2.2   The relationship of logic and language
This logical puzzle seems to me to have proved so insoluble (despite concert-
ed efforts since the time of Aristotle) because of a mistaken view of the rela-
tionship between language and logic, leading to the aforementioned failure to 
accord pragmatics with its proper place in semantics. The general view of 
logic is that it is (in the words of Kant, worth quoting at length):
… a science a priori of the necessary laws of thinking, not, however, in 
respect of particular objects but all objects in general: it is a science, 
therefore, of the right use of the understanding and of reason as such, 
not subjectively, i.e. not according to empirical (psychological) principles 
of how the understanding thinks, but objectively, i.e. according to a priori 
principles of how it ought to think. (1974: 18).
On the popular view Kant here seems to be endorsing, natural language is an 
attempt to approach the perfect model of logic. In this case, the logical puzzle 
of vagueness is deeply worrying, and seemingly requires that we acknowl-
edge that our vague natural language expressions, such as ‘bald’, are incoher-
ent, since the sorites shows that all people are both bald and not bald – a 
route taken by some (see for example Dummett 1975; Eklund 2002), but leav-
ing us with the task of explaining how natural language is useful despite be-
ing incoherent.
An alternative view of logic is that it is an idealization of our actual lin-
guistic practice, not Kant’s ‘objective’ science of the necessary laws of reason-
ing. On this alternative view, logical rules or axioms (such as modus ponens, 
reductio, and the Peano arithmetic induction axiom mentioned above) may be 
powerful, useful, and revealing, but will ultimately be defeasible in the sense 
that we may discover aspects or contexts of our reasoning practice which 
clash with the logical rules or axioms, and which upon reflection, we take to 
reveal not incoherence in our linguistic practice, but rather a failure of those 
rules or axioms to correctly model our practice in that context.
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As an illustrative parallel, our practice of identifying faces can be ideal-
ized as involving a small set of geometrical measurements: distance between 
eyes versus distance to top of lip, and so on. Such idealizations can be tremen-
dously powerful, enabling algorithmic facial recognition despite partial obscu-
ration or changes over time, resulting in insights into aspects of human visual 
processing, and even in corrections to our practice (for example, we may de-
cide on the basis of data from the algorithm that we might have mistakenly 
identified someone in a photograph). That said, the discovery of human-dis-
tinct faces which are indistinguishable to the algorithm would not be treated 
as a discovery that actually these faces are indistinguishable and our practice 
is somehow incoherent. Rather, the discovery would show us a way in which 
the idealization fails to capture our actual practice. Whether the idealization 
should then be changed in order to capture our actual practice more faithfully 
would depend on the context of use. Where the idealization is unchanged, 
uses of the idealized practice might need to at least be made sensitive to 
where the idealization fails (for example, if glitter eye shadow is found to af-
fect facial recognition in an automated passport control gate, we might add a 
separate initial check for it).
On this view, the logical puzzle of vagueness in conjunction with our gen-
erally unproblematic ability to identify bald and blonde people tells us that 
our idealization has missed something relevant in our linguistic practice, not 
that this practice is incoherent.
3.0   Towards a pragmatic account of meaning
3.1   The failure of set-theoretic semantics
Again since the time of Aristotle, logicians have struggled with set-theoretic 
semantics: with giving lists of necessary and sufficient conditions for member-
ship in sets, which were intended to serve as the meaning of terms. On the 
set-theoretic view, chairs are elements with the features (say) ‘supported by 
legs’, ‘raised surface’, ‘designed to sit on’; baldness is presumably defined as a 
function of number of hairs, or volume of hair, and so on. However, all such 
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lists admit of counter-examples (just not to all conditions at once) – many 
chairs have no legs, there are ornamental chairs not designed to sit on, and so 
on – such that they cannot be used to identify the reference of terms (the set 
of all chairs).
Given also that we can correctly use terms even without the conceptual 
resources to understand or evaluate many of these conditions (a child, say, 
who can pick a chair from a furniture line-up, but may have never considered 
that someone made the chair, let alone what their design intention might 
have been), these conditions do not seem to be part of our sense of terms. In-
deed, the difficulty of creating such lists suggests likewise: if we do chance 
upon a term which admits of definition through necessary and sufficient con-
ditions, this feels like a discovery, not a mere explication of our practice.
To put these two points another way, the set-theoretic approach clashes 
with the intuition expressed in (T) that vague terms do not have a precise 
boundary of application, as would be the case if their semantics were based 
on such lists of features. So, set-theoretic semantics fails to give the reference 
of terms, seems largely unrelated to the sense of terms, and has a fundamen-
tal difficulty with vague terms.
3.2   An alternative view: concepts defined by prototypes
However, now unburdened by the need to fit our practice to a particular logi-
cal idealization (§2.2), we can seek an alternative account. A productive place 
to start is Rosch’s (1978) work on ‘prototypical’ members of categories, which 
uses ‘similarity [to a central prototype]’ in place of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. This model, I think, neatly accommodates the intuition given in (T) 
that boundaries are not a part of the meaning of vague terms. That is, rather 
than defining the set of bald people by the edges our intuition denies exist, 
the set is defined by its central prototype; elements which are sufficiently 
similar to the prototype of ‘is bald’ are bald.
This model also seems to fit well with how concepts are learnt: we point 
to an example of baldness and name it. Teaching or learning concepts in this 
way requires a rich shared understanding of how the process works, for ex-
ample of how examples are used (which aspect of the person pointed out as 
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bald comprises their baldness?). There is a rich language used to negotiate or 
better understand a new concept, including giving multiple examples and 
comparing how bald they are, helping establish what criteria of similarity 
baldness operates with; we indicate how prototypical examples are by using 
language like ‘clearly bald’ (prototypical), ‘quite bald’ (marginal but on the 
right continuum) or ‘kind of bald, but …’ (marginal by virtue of differing from 
the prototype in a relevant respect).
Note that categories may have multiple prototypes. People in many com-
munities, for example, may have one prototype of dogs (of the sole endemic 
breed), while the modern urbanite may be forced to have several prototypes 
to accommodate Chihuahuas and Rottweilers and so on; while a more general 
term like ‘animal’ is likely to have a large number of prototypes, mirroring 
the varieties of animal considered important in each context. Prototypes may 
presumably also be non-objects, such as functions, histories, and so on. My in-
tuition is that an understanding of ‘chair’ requires both a form-prototype (a 
3D model of a chair) and a function-prototype (something like ‘portable object 
for a person to sit on’). This does not mean, however, that ‘chair’ is ambiguous 
– we evaluate items as chairs, a single lexical item and concept, with regard 
to both form and function. It is, perhaps, somewhat like being a celebrity – 
there are a number of ways one can be a celebrity (through wealth, lifestyle, 
controversial actions, connection to other celebrities, social media followers, 
and so on), and genuinely prototypical celebrities will fit more of these than 
will marginal celebrities, but being a celebrity is not thereby multiply ambigu-
ous. Objects that are sufficiently similar to both form and function prototypes 
are clearly chairs; objects that fit one but not the other are marginal and can 
be considered chairs or not chairs depending on the context (a form-perfect 
doll’s chair is likely not a chair in a conversation where people are looking for 
a portable object to sit on; a function-perfect beanbag is likely not a chair in a 
conversation about the evolution of the ornamented cresting rail).
Note also that prototypes may presumably be given linguistically. Indeed, 
in my own case at least, even prototypes I have learnt ostensively (through 
an actual example) seem in some ways linguistic rather than based on an im-
age. That is, my memory seems less like a detail-rich photograph and more 
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like a quick sketch or a couple of notes that can be used to imaginatively rec-
reate an image on demand: there is, for example, a bald pate, but I would be 
creating details were I to add any particular face or body, or indeed color. 
Having once understood what continuum ‘is bald’ operates over (from shiny 
pate to luxuriant head of hair), irrelevant details in my mental image have 
fallen away until I’m no longer sure if my prototype is a linguistic description 
or a radically incomplete sketch. That said, my prototype images of a chair, 
or of a bald man, whether these are remembered as images or reconstituted 
from language-like cues, are credible candidates for my sense (§1.2) of ‘chair’ 
and ‘bald’.
Returning for a moment to our vague predicate examples, the identifica-
tion of number of head hairs as the appropriate continuum on which to run a 
sorites for ‘is bald’ has attracted remarkably little comment in the 2400 years 
or so that the puzzle has been creating a literature. It seems to me that bald-
ness is more about a gestalt lack of distributed hair volume that about num-
bers of hairs, such that I would be happier applying ‘is bald’ to a man with a 
million imperceptibly short and fine hairs than to a man with one thick frayed 
hair coiled across his head – though in this latter case a high wind might 
make me change my mind. Similar comments apply to ‘is blonde’: while candi-
date tiny changes for (T) presumably include a decrease in the luminance of a 
hair, or the addition of one eumelanin molecule to a hair, and so on, blonde-
ness seems to be less about the number of eumelanin molecules or some kind 
of sum of hair luminances than about a gestalt luminance, which brings into 
view the overall distribution of pigment (reduced eumelanin in the form of 
adding white stripes to black hair, for example, would not constitute blonde-
ness), and possibly attention to eyebrows, skin tone, and so on. This dissatis-
faction with ‘number of hairs’ or ‘number of eumelanin molecules’ is, I think, a 
symptom of the failure of the project of set-theoretic semantics noted in §3.1 
above – no number of hairs, or of eumelanin molecules, constitute necessary 
and sufficient conditions for membership of the respective sets. The problem 
is, again, neatly avoided by the prototype theory. I have one or more proto-
types of ‘blonde’ – on reflection, probably two, a natural blonde with yellow-
hued hair, and a bottle blonde with white hair and dark eyebrows – with re-
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spect to which I evaluate candidate blondes. Which (if any) prototype gets 
primacy, and exactly how I evaluate similarity, and what degree of similarity 
is sufficient, depends on the context – on pragmatic issues.
3.3    Communicating and reasoning using concepts defined  
by prototypes
Let us consider, then, how we evaluate and use ‘John is bald’ in reasoning. 
With ‘is bald’ defined by a prototype (‘looking sufficiently like this’) rather 
than a precise necessary and sufficient condition (‘having less than 7,341 head 
hairs’), logical semanticists who believe necessary and sufficient conditions are 
constitutive of meaning may be concerned that in the absence of a boundary, 
we will be unable to judge whether a borderline John is bald; or that given 
the information that John is bald, we will be somehow restricted in the ways 
we can use this information in reasoning because we cannot locate the pre-
cise area on the continuum of baldness where John lies (as, for example, ‘John 
is bald, so he has between 0 and 7,340 head hairs’ would).
The short answer is presumably that having shown that necessary and 
sufficient conditions are not constitutive of meaning (§3.1), and that we have 
an alternative account of the meaning of concepts (§3.2), lacking such condi-
tions is not a concern we are bound to address. Further, since our actual lin-
guistic practice is prior to logic (§2.2), our actual linguistic practice clearly in-
volves successfully communicating and reasoning with vague concepts, then 
if any work is to be done, it is to be done by the classical logicians whose ide-
alization of our practice is thus revealed to be insufficient.
However, a sketch of a more positive answer is easy to give. Vague pred-
icates such as ‘is bald’ apply to the set of items which are sufficiently similar 
to a prototype. Similarity can be evaluated in a variety of ways, and depends 
not only on the features of the prototype and of other related prototypes, but 
also on a range of pragmatic issues, including the conversational purpose and 
what other competing predicates are available as alternatives. That is, John 
may be ‘bald, as against hairy’, but ‘not bald, as against balding’; he may be 
bald in a conversation about hypothermia (his fine fuzz has no heat retentive 
value), but not bald in a conversation about hat chafing.
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The methods noted above (§3.2) as used to indicate similarity to proto-
typicality (clearly, quite, kind of bald) can be used to adjust the extension of a 
predicate. That is, if John is not clearly bald, we do not count his hairs or in 
general worry about the boundaries of applicability in an attempt to decide 
whether he is bald or not; instead, we modify ‘bald’, or choose a different and 
clearly applicable term. For example, John may be clearly balding, quite bald, 
thinning, or receding, and so on. In this way, the communicative (informational) 
value of the utterance is maximized: ‘John is [ceteris paribus clearly] balding’ 
is more informative than ‘[It is true or borderline that] John is bald’.
Put another way, our being able to obey the general conversational maxim 
that we should be as informative as is required for the purposes of the ex-
change (Grice 1989) depends on our ability to modify vague predicates so that 
our utterances are not borderline. That is to say, all else being equal, we 
choose a (modified) predicate which is clearly true – is true on all reasonable 
variations of interpretation (of the current conversational purpose and of per-
sonal differences in prototypical similarity evaluation; in other words, of what 
the person I’m talking to might reasonably understand me to mean by ‘bald’ 
etc. in this case) – so that what is thereby communicated is not just true but 
clearly true.
Indeed, it is surely when there are precise boundaries that problems with 
applicability and reasoning occur. If ‘is bald’ means ‘having less than 7,341 
head hairs’, we would be in the ridiculous situation of having to count hairs in 
order to determine the applicability of the predicate. And a not-bald John 
could unknowingly become bald by losing a hair in the time it takes us to 
perform some minor act of reasoning.
4.0   Responding to the sorites
This improved understanding of the relationship of logic and language (§2.2) 
and the semantics and pragmatic use of vague terms (§3) does not however, 
directly avoid the sorites paradox. Though the stakes no longer seem so high 
(the sorites indicates a problem in classical logic, not ubiquitous incoherence 
in our linguistic practice), we need to identify which of (1), (T), and the logical 
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rules used to derive the paradoxical conclusion (§2.0) are objectionable, and 
confirm that this solution is sufficient to the various possible formulations of 
the sorites (§2.1).
4.1    A response can be logically ad hoc  
but pragmatically acceptable
I believe this task is simplified by the primacy of our linguistic practice, be-
cause it is open to us to look for whatever aspect of our linguistic practice is 
violated by each sorites formulation. If logic were prior, we would be bound 
to find a logically principled and presumably singular response to the sorites; 
but we can now, I suggest, object to different moves in different contexts or 
for different formulations, just as in our linguistic practice it is open to us to 
respond to different communicative demands in different contexts by chang-
ing the language we use and the standards we are using to apply or judge 
that language.
If we grant that capable speakers would assent to (1) and deny (2), then 
(T) and its repeated application is the obvious target.
A prototype theorist might deny (T) outright, on the grounds that having 
one hair makes the man no longer prototypically bald; a man with one hair is 
of course highly similar to the prototype, but in the specific context of facing 
interrogation regarding the meaning of the term, even this similarity might 
not be enough to make ‘bald’ applicable. However, this strategy won’t work 
for all vague predicates – ‘is hairy’ is presumably clearly true at 1 million 
hairs, but the loss of a hair does not represent a convincing qualitative 
change, so a sorites paradox using a million applications of the contraposition 
of (T) will yield that a man with no hair is hairy. More generally, while ‘is 
bald’ and ‘is dark’ and ‘is quiet’ may admit of this solution (as there is a quali-
tative difference between perfect baldness/dark/quiet and there being some 
hair/light/noise), many other vague predicates will not admit of this solution 
and so the problem remains.
One reason (T) is convincing is that there is a pragmatic assumption that 
‘is bald’ means ‘is [clearly] bald’ – because otherwise, we would say something 
else – and a small difference should indeed not take us from ‘[clearly] bald’ to 
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‘[clearly] not bald’ (such a transition would require going through ‘nearly bald’ 
and so on first). The sorites denies us the opportunity to start equivocating at 
some point (‘well actually maybe that’s only nearly bald’) and then, acknowl-
edging the intuition expressed by (T), to revise some earlier answers to like-
wise be ‘nearly bald’, and so on – in other words, to repeatedly revise our in-
terpretation of ‘is bald’ in response to the changing context, which includes 
our previous answers, the intuition that (T), and a changing understanding of 
what the purpose of this strange conversation is. So, if the sorites is taken as 
a series of a million questions, with the classical logician pushing us to break 
the pragmatic rules governing the proper use of ‘bald’ by insisting that each 
question is answered with simply ‘yes’ or ‘no’, not with an evasion or a recast, 
we should feel quite unapologetic about not playing along.
4.2   Rejecting cut (transitivity)
However, the sorites in §2.0 abbreviates the steps during which such equivo-
cation could occur: a million repeats of universal instantiation and modus po-
nens and cut followed by additional applications of cut (§2.1).
One response, then, is to reject cut, or restrict repeated application of it 
when reasoning about vague terms. Indiscriminability, we might note, is an 
intransitive relation, and (T) is credible because it represents an indiscrim-
inable change; but chaining indiscriminable changes together can result in a 
discriminable change apt to change the applicability of a vague predicate.
While some formulations of the sorites may require such a response, the in-
ductive formalization does not use cut. Proceeding to therefore reject both 
cut and induction feels unnecessarily radical.
4.3   Rejecting bivalence (the ‘fuzzy logic’ approach)
An alternative response is to take ‘true’ as itself a vague term admitting of 
degrees, taking seriously talk of ‘clearly true’ and ‘somewhat true’ and so on. 
This fits well with my suggestion in §3.3 that a sentence is ‘clearly true’ (or: 
completely similar to a prototype of a true sentence) when it is true on all 
reasonable variations of interpretation (of the current conversational purpose 
and of personal differences in prototypical similarity evaluation).
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Degrees of truth can be formalized logically as, say, the closed interval 
[0,1] where 0 and 1 represent perfect falsehood and perfect truth respectively, 
and where generalization of bivalent truth-functionality is by means of arith-
metical operations on values (for example, v(P&Q) = max (v(P), v(Q); see Cope-
land 1997: 518). If (T) has a truth value of 0.9999, then each use of (T) results 
in a tiny drop in truth-value, such that (1) is perfectly true and (2) perfectly 
false. This, I think, accords well with our intuitions regarding the sorites: (T) 
is true for all practical purposes, the reasoning is acceptable; each step is al-
most perfectly convincing, each small section of steps looks quite convincing, 
but the series as a whole is unconvincing.
The natural fuzzy logic understanding of validity is I think that an argu-
ment is valid to the degree in which it is truth-preserving: that it, valid to de-
gree α just in case when all its premisses are true to degree ㌼, then its con-
clusion is true to degree at least ㌼-(1-α) (see for example Williamson 1994: 123). 
The sorites is thereby perfectly invalid, for the conclusion can take a value 
arbitrarily close to zero while the premisses take values arbitrarily close to 
one. Modus ponens, in contrast, is valid only to degree 0.5, a result which leads 
Williamson to reject this understanding of validity (1994: 124). However, mo-
dus ponens is perfectly valid in the special (classical) case of reasoning with in-
tegral truth values, and is highly valid when reasoning with formulae taking 
values close to integral values. This is, I suggest, appropriate: reasoning with 
half-truths can yield conclusions that are mostly false, and this is one more 
reason why we are generally at pains to say only what is clearly true (§3.3). 
Induction, likewise, preserves perfect truth but not nearly perfect truth, so 
the inductive version of the sorites fails; and the least number principle comes 
out as true to only degree 0.5 in the presence of non-integral truth values, so 
that version also fails, and so on.
4.4   Higher orders of vagueness
The consensus in the philosophical literature seems to be that a fuzzy logic 
response to vagueness is unacceptable because it introduces arbitrary bound-
aries, violating our intuition that (T), in particular where the truth of Bn 
switches from an integral to a non-integral value (see for example Sainsbury 
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1991: §4, Tye 1994: 191, Williamson 1994: 127-31, Burgess 1998: 236). A similar 
objection can be made to my suggestion that a sentence is ‘clearly true’ when 
it is true on all reasonable variations of interpretation. That is, while the ma-
chinery of pragmatically ‘reasonable interpretations’ or of fuzzy logic has 
avoided the need for a sharp line between true and false cases, we now need 
a sharp line between the ‘clearly/perfectly true’ cases and cases that are not 
clearly/perfectly true. Claiming that this boundary is also vague introduces 
second-order vagueness, and moves the objection to the sharp boundary be-
tween ‘clearly clearly true’ cases and ‘not-clearly clearly true’ cases, and so 
on.
However, the force of this objection is I think largely lost if linguistic 
practice is considered prior to logic. The notion of borderline borderline cases 
seems coherent: Sorenson (2010) suggests borderline hermaphrodites as a re-
al-world example, and we can perhaps imagine talk of borderline borderline 
hermaphrodites. But even ‘borderline hermaphrodites’ is ambiguous between 
people who are perhaps a little too male to be hermaphrodites and people 
who are perhaps a little too female to be hermaphrodites; and ‘borderline bor-
derline hermaphrodites’ is ambiguous between four groups, and so on, making 
it an entirely unhelpful predicate and one which we would therefore avoid.
Even merely ‘borderline hermaphrodite’, which Sorenson offers as an ex-
ample of second-order vagueness, might be better understood as first-order 
vagueness. That is to say, ‘hermaphrodite’ does not simply mean ‘borderline 
male-female’, but rather has its own criteria of use. As a parallel, establishing 
a country C on the border between countries A and B does not introduce 
second-order vagueness: rather, A and B no longer share a border, which are 
now between A-C and C-B. Once C is established, that area is no longer bor-
derline A-B, but includes an area of clear C which is thereby clearly neither 
A nor B.
In any case, logic is intended to model our linguistic and reasoning be-
havior, and there is little by way of ‘higher order vagueness’ behavior to be 
modelled, with even what was intended as a clear example of second-order 
vagueness liable to collapse back to first-order. We can certainly apply our 
chosen treatment of the logical problem of vagueness (I argue above for al-
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lowing degrees of truth) to higher orders, but any infinite regress is simply a 
formal possibility, an artifact of the model, similar to the possibility of creating 
predicates like ‘clearly clearly borderline clearly bald’. Complex predicates ex-
pressing higher orders of vagueness are multiply ambiguous, communicative-
ly unrewarding, and are avoided, but can be accommodated if necessary by 
both our language and our fuzzy logic model of it.
5.0   Conclusion
I have argued that pragmatic issues (how social context can help determine 
meaning) have been systematically undervalued in semantical theorizing 
(§1.4). Making out the reference or sense of terms without taking the social 
context into account is generally impossible, given that language is a (largely) 
social activity.
I have also argued that language is prior to logic, in the sense that logic 
is a defeasible idealization of our linguistic practice of reasoning (§2.2). While 
logic can inform our practice, logical paradoxes such as the sorites are more 
apt to show how logic fails to adequately model our practice than to show 
that our practice is broadly incoherent. Where such a failure is identified, an 
alternative logical model (potentially a logically ad hoc one for a limited con-
text, §4.1) may be offered. Fuzzy logic offers such a model for contexts such 
as the sorites which appears sufficient to the range of different possible for-
mulations of the paradox (§4.3). It is computationally more complex that clas-
sical logic, but yields classical logic as a special case where truth values are 
integral, which given our usual pains to say only what is clearly true, means 
that classical logic can be retained in most contexts. Attempts to object to the 
fuzzy logic model by claiming that higher-order vagueness introduces a re-
gress of sharp boundaries are not convincing because the fuzzy logician can 
model as much of a regress as is necessary to accommodate our actual prac-
tice, and deny the necessity to continue the regress further (§4.4).
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